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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1969, the Supreme Court placed a premium on First 
Amendment protection in the school when high school students 
protested the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands.1 In Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Court held 
that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” and allowed students to 
display their anti-Vietnam beliefs on their sleeves in spite of objection 
by the school district.2 Tinker has served as the bedrock case for First 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., May 2006, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The 
author would like express her gratitude to Melinda Cupps Dickler, Sheldon Nahmod, 
Hal Morris, Sandra Stipp, and her classmates in the SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW for 
their invaluable comments on this Note, and to Chris Gardino for inspiring the title 
to this Note. The author dedicates this Note to her Mom and Dad for their constant 
love and support.  
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker is 
the most important Supreme Court case in history protecting the constitutional rights 
of students. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave their First Amendment Rights at 
the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527 (2000). 
2 393 U.S. at 506. 
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Amendment regulation of student speech in holding that a school 
cannot prohibit student speech unless it “materially and substantially 
disrupt[s] the work and discipline of school”3 (the “substantial 
disruption” standard) or “collide[s] with the rights of others” (the 
“rights of others” standard”).4  
However, the Supreme Court has chipped away at its pro-student 
holding since Tinker by allowing school officials to prohibit student 
speech where it is lewd or vulgar,5 school-sponsored,6 or advocates 
illegal drug use.7 In its most recent case, Morse v. Frederick, the 
Supreme Court held that a school could prohibit speech that is 
reasonably regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.8 At the same 
time, the Morse majority left an ambiguity of whether political speech, 
such as speech supporting the legalization of illegal drugs, could be 
prohibited by its ruling.9 In an effort to limit the effect of the 
majority’s ambiguity, Justice Alito concurred to clarify that the 
majority opinion created another exception to Tinker for speech 
promoting illegal drug use and should not be read as support for 
restricting speech that commented on a political or social issue.10  
On April 23, 2008, the Seventh Circuit rejected Justice Alito’s 
concurrence and applied Morse to political speech in Nuxoll ex rel. 
                                                 
3 Id. at 513. The Supreme Court defined the substantial disruption standard by 
quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Id. at 509. The Court 
also indicated that there must be a “material and substantial interference with 
schoolwork or discipline” or conduct that forecasted a “substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities.” Id. at 511, 514. This Note refers to all 
of this language as included in the “substantial disruption” standard.  
4 Id. at 513.  
5 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
6 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
7 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007). 
8 Id.  
9 Id. at 2620-21. Morse left the ambiguity that political speech, which was “the 
important constitutional value Tinker sought to protect,” could be included in the 
majority’s ruling. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
10 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District No. 204.11 Nuxoll involved a 
student protest to the “Day of Silence,” a day promoted by the Gay, 
Lesbian, and Straight Education Network every April that advocates 
tolerance of others with a focus on tolerance of homosexuality.12 In 
April 2006, Heidi Zamecnik wore a t-shirt displaying the slogan “Be 
Happy, Not Gay” in counterprotest to the “Day of Silence.”13 School 
officials at Necqua Valley High School in Naperville, Illinois, made 
Zamecnik cross out the words “Not Gay;” subsequently, Zamecnik and 
freshman Alexander Nuxoll filed a lawsuit to enjoin the school from 
prohibiting the t-shirt.14 When faced with this case, the district court 
denied the request for a preliminary injunction relying on the Rights of 
Others standard from Tinker.15  
In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed the case relying on the substantial disruption standard in 
Tinker.16 The Seventh Circuit granted Nuxoll’s preliminary injunction 
to wear the t-shirt, which appeared to be a victory for the student 
speakers.17 However, the victory was fleeting as the majority adopted 
a new definition of Substantial Disruption that will allow schools to 
restrict vast amounts of speech in the future.18 Although Morse dealt 
with speech promoting illegal drug use, the Seventh Circuit applied 
the case when faced with the political message “Be Happy, Not 
Gay.”19 The Seventh Circuit used Morse for the proposition that a 
Substantial Disruption includes the psychological effects that one 
student’s speech would have on other students as well as the actual 
                                                 
11 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008).  
12 Id. at 670. 
13 Zamecnik ex. rel. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204 Bd. of 
Educ., 2007 WL 1141597, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2007).  
14 Id.  
15 Id. at *11.  
16 See Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 676.  
17 Eugene Volokh, High School Student Speech and “Be Happy, Not Gay” T-
Shirt, http://volokh.com/posts/1209077493.shtml (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).  
18 Id.  
19 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674. 
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disorder the speech creates in the school environment.20 Thus, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a Substantial Disruption occurs if there is 
reason to believe that a type of student speech “will lead to a decline 
in students’ test scores, an upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of a 
sick school.”21  
First, this Note delves into why First Amendment jurisprudence 
regarding student speech on school grounds is a murky area of 
constitutional law. Then this Note discusses the reasoning behind the 
Seventh Circuit’s expansion of the “substantial disruption” standard. 
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit’s definition of “substantial 
disruption” is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. This Note also 
opines that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion will allow schools to prohibit 
a broad range of speech and will quiet student speakers throughout the 
circuit. 
Part I discusses the evolution of the Supreme Court student 
speech cases, beginning with Tinker. Part II explores the confusion 
among lower courts when dealing with student speech cases by 
contrasting the approaches of two lower courts that addressed t-shirts 
with slogans similar to “Be Happy, Not Gay.” Part III goes over the 
underlying facts, the district court opinion, and the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Nuxoll. Part IV evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in 
Nuxoll in light of Supreme Court precedent and opinions from other 
lower courts in addition to considering how Nuxoll will affect future 
student speech cases.  
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE SCHOOL 
SYSTEM THROUGH THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
There have been four major decisions that have shaped Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on a school’s regulation of student speech, 
beginning with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
                                                 
20 Id. (emphasis added). 
21 Id. (emphasis added). 
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District.22 Tinker was the first case where the Court protected actual 
student expression in public schools.23 The Court made it clear in 
Tinker that students do not surrender their First Amendment rights 
when they enter a classroom.24 Over the next 40 years, the Supreme 
Court narrowed the student-centered holding in Tinker, allowing 
school authorities to restrict student speech where the speech was 
vulgar or lewd,25 was school-sponsored,26 or advocated the 
consumption of illegal drugs.27  
 
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
 
In 1965, a group of students wore black armbands to their school 
in protest of the Vietnam War.28 The school district learned of the 
protest and adopted a policy prohibiting the armbands.29 The students 
were all sent home from school and suspended until they came back 
without the armbands.30 Subsequently, two of the students filed suit 
against their school district seeking an injunction.31  
In Tinker, the Court recognized that neither teachers nor students 
shed their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.32 The Court also created two 
                                                 
22 See 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675 (1986), Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), and 
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), are the other important cases. 
23 Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1536 (7th Cir. 1996); see 
also W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (U.S. 1943), (The Supreme 
Court first recognizing the free speech interests of public school students in holding 
that a compulsory flag salute exercise was an unconstitutional coercion of belief). 
24 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.  
25 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
26 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
27 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629. 
28 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 506. 
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standards to determine whether a school may prohibit student speech 
in holding that student expression may not be restricted unless it 
“materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work and discipline of 
school” (the “substantial disruption” standard) or “collid[es] with the 
rights of others” (the “rights of others” standard).33 The Court found 
that the school’s prohibition of the armbands was unconstitutional, as 
the school authorities had no reason to believe that the wearing of the 
armbands would substantially interfere with the school environment or 
intrude on other students’ rights.34 
The Court proclaimed that school officials could not discipline the 
students for “a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied 
by any disorder or disturbance.”35 The Court also found it significant 
that the school district barred only one viewpoint.36 The school district 
adopted a policy against wearing black armbands only but did not 
prohibit any other symbols of political or controversial significance.37 
Thus, the Court held that the prohibition of one opinion alone was 
unconstitutional without evidence that it was necessary to avoid 
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline.38  
                                                 
33 Id. at 513. 
34 Id. at 509. Lower courts generally apply the substantial disruption” standard 
and rarely apply the “rights of others” standard. Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse 
Quartet: Student Speech and the First Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 363-64 
(2007). 
35 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
36 Id. at 511. See also Abby Marie Mollen, Comment, In Defense of the 
“Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 
1511-12 (2008) (exploring how courts have long disagreed about whether Tinker 
prohibits viewpoint discrimination). This issue was also a major difference between 
the majority and the concurrence in Nuxoll. See discussion infra Part III.C.  
37 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510. 
38 Id. at 511. The Supreme Court also noted that schools should not be 
“enclaves of totalitarianism” and allow only beliefs the school chooses to 
communicate. Id. Rather, a school should be a “marketplace of ideas” which fosters 
learning and understanding through a “multitude of tongues.” Id. 
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Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker may have been instructive to the 
Supreme Court when faced with future student speech cases.39 Justice 
Black warned that the majority’s holding would allow students to defy 
teachers in the name of free speech.40 He felt that the Tinker opinion 
would induce the school to “surrender control of the American public 
school system to public school students.”41  
 
B. Lewd and Vulgar Speech: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
 
In 1986, the Court placed a check on student speech by allowing a 
school to restrict vulgar and lewd speech in Bethel School District No. 
403 v. Fraser.42 The Court found that a school district acted within its 
authority in suspending a student who gave a speech at an assembly 
that contained an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”43 
The Court held that the First Amendment did not prohibit school 
officials from regulating lewd or offensive speech where it “would 
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”44 The Court 
recognized that “the constitutional rights of students in the public 
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings.”45 The majority’s deference towards the school district 
was readily apparent when it cited Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker for 
                                                 
39 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 n.4 (1988) 
(noting the relevance of Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker to Fraser and Hazelwood); 
see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(stating that Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker “has proved prophetic”). 
40 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 526. 
42 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
43 Id. at 678, 685. The speech opened with the line “I know a man who is 
firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is firm—but 
most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.” Id. at 687 (Brennan, 
J., concurring).  
44 Id. at 685 (majority opinion). 
45 Id. at 682. The Court based this statement in part on N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325 (1985), which held that a school needs reasonable suspicion, and not probable 
cause, to search a student. Id. 
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the proposition that the Constitution does not compel schools to 
surrender control to their students.46 
The Fraser decision seemed to create an exception to Tinker when 
the student speech was vulgar, lewd, or highly offensive.47 The Court 
noted a “marked distinction” between the political viewpoint 
addressed in Tinker and the sexual content in the student’s speech.48 
The Court noted that schools had a compelling interest in prohibiting 
vulgar and lewd speech because of its role of teaching students “the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior”49 and because the speech 
could be potentially damaging to a young audience.50 Furthermore, the 
Court overruled the Ninth Circuit, which relied on the Tinker 
substantial disruption standard when finding that there was no 
evidence on the record that the speech caused a substantial 
disruption.51 
 
C. School-Sponsored Speech: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
 
Two years later, the Court again allowed school authorities to 
prohibit speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.52 In 
Hazelwood, the Court ruled it constitutional for a school district to 
forbid articles about teen pregnancy and divorce from appearing in the 
school newspaper.53 The Court stressed that the school was entitled to 
great control over student expression that may be attributed to the 
school, such as a school newspaper or play.54 The Court found a 
                                                 
46 Id. at 686.  
47 Id. at 685.  
48 See id. at 680; see also id. at 685 (“Unlike the sanctions imposed on the 
students wearing armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were 
unrelated to any political viewpoint.”). 
49 Id. at 681.  
50 See id. at 683 (stating that the speech was “insulting to teenage girl students” 
and could be “seriously damaging to its less mature audience”). 
51 Id. at 679.  
52 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988).  
53 Id. at 264. 
54 Id. at 271. 
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distinction between a student’s personal expression as in Tinker and 
speech that might be “reasonably perceiv[ed] to bear the imprimatur of 
the school.”55 The Court granted school authorities greater control in 
prohibiting school-sponsored speech than other student expression 
governed under Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard.56 Thus, the 
Court held that a school may restrict school-sponsored speech “so long 
as [its] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”57  
The Supreme Court appeared to create a clear exception to Tinker 
for speech that was school-sponsored.58 Like Fraser, the Court again 
overruled the appellate court’s application of the “substantial 
disruption” standard.59 Also, the majority in Hazelwood seemed to 
acknowledge that Fraser was a distinct exception to Tinker, rather 
than an application of the case.60 The dissent in Hazelwood asserted 
that Fraser was analyzed under Tinker.61 The majority responded to 
the dissent in a footnote, stating that the decision in Fraser rested on 
the vulgar, lewd, and plainly offensive character of the speech 
delivered at the school assembly rather than on any propensity of the 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 272. The Court found that Tinker addressed the “educators’ ability to 
silence a student’s personal expression that happened to occur on the school 
premises,” while Hazelwood concerned that “educators’ authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that 
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school.” Id. 
57 Id. at 273.  
58 See id. at 272-73 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in 
Tinker for determining when a school may punish student expression need not also 
be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and 
resources to the dissemination of student expression.”). 
59 Id. at 265. The lower court found there was no evidence that the censored 
articles would have materially disrupted the school environment. Id. 
60 Id. at 272 n.4. 
61 Id. at 281 (Brennan, J. dissenting).  
 223
9
Powers: Unraveling <em>Tinker</em>: The Seventh Circuit Leaves Student Sp
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
speech to “‘materially disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.’”62 
 
D. Speech that Advocates Illegal Drug Use: Morse v. Frederick 
 
The Supreme Court continued to tear away students’ rights to free 
speech in Morse v. Frederick.63 In the 2007 case, the school district 
did not violate a student’s constitutional rights by prohibiting him 
from displaying a “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner at a school-
sponsored event where students watched the Olympic torch relay 
come through Alaska.64 The student conceded that the words mean
nothing and were just “nonsense meant to attract television 
cameras.”
t 
 
 
drugs.   
                                                
65 Nonetheless, the Court decided to rule on the case66 and
held that a school may restrict speech that advocates the consumption
of illegal 67
In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the dangers of illicit 
drug use and found that deterring drug use by school children was a 
compelling interest.68 The Court stated that “‘[s]chool years are the 
time when physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are 
most severe. . .’”69 Furthermore, the effects of drugs were not only felt 
 
62 Id. at 272 n.4 (majority opinion) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).  
63 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007). 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 2624 (quoting the district court case, Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 
1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2006)). Two law students argued that the Supreme Court 
only took this case because of its popularity as the “Bong Hits” case. Andrew Canter 
& Gabriel Pardo, Notes & Comments, The Court’s Missed Opportunity in Harper v. 
Poway, 2008 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 125, 125 (2008). These students argued that a more 
useful decision would have been to address a case like Harper. Id.  
66 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624. The Supreme Court found it reasonable that 
Principal Morse thought the banner could be perceived as promoting illegal drug use. 
Id.  
67 Id. at 2629. 
68 Id. at 2628.  
69 See id. (quoting Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-62 
(1995)). 
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by the drug users, but the entire educational process was disrupted.70 
Thus, the Court found that the school could prohibit speech that 
encouraged drug use.71 In doing so, the Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s finding that the school district did not demonstrate that the 
speech gave rise to a “substantial disruption.”72 
Morse appeared to set Fraser and Hazelwood out as exceptions to 
the Tinker.73 Fraser and Hazelwood proved that the analysis in Tinker 
was not “the only basis for restricting student speech.”74 The Court 
noted that the mode of analysis in Fraser was “not entirely clear,” but 
it certainly did not did not apply the “substantial disruption” standard 
in reaching its holding.75 Furthermore, Hazelwood was not controlling 
because no one would reasonably believe that the “BONG HiTS” 
banner bore the school’s imprimatur.76  
Justice Alito, in a concurrence with Justice Kennedy, joined the 
majority but wrote separately to clarify some of the majority’s 
ambiguities.77 Justice Alito concurred in the opinion on the 
understanding that the case added a third exception to Tinker, along 
with Fraser and Hazelwood.78 He explained that the majority opinion 
in Morse went “no further than to hold that a public school may 
restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
                                                 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 2629.  
72 Id. at 2623. 
73 Id. at 2626. 
74 Id. at 2627.  
75 See id. (referencing footnote four in Hazelwood where the Court disagreed 
with the proposition that there was no difference between the First Amendment 
analysis applied in Tinker and that applied in Fraser and noting that the holding in 
Fraser was not based on any showing of substantial disruption).  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring) 
78 See id. at 2637 (“In addition to Tinker, [Morse] allows the restriction of 
speech advocating illegal drug use;” [Fraser] “permits the regulation of speech that 
is delivered in a lewd or vulgar manner as part of a middle school program;” and 
[Hazelwood] “allows a school to regulate what is in essence the school’s own 
speech.”). 
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advocating illegal drug use.”79 He asserted that the case “provide[d] 
no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be 
interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue.”80 He also 
opined that any argument for foregoing a Tinker analysis must be 
based on a special characteristic of school, and the characteristic that 
was relevant in Morse was the threat of the physical safety of the 
students.81 In his opinion, the Morse majority should not be re
permit the censorship of any speech that interferes with a school’s 
educational mission because that argument “can easily be manipulated 
in dangerous ways.”
ad to 
 
                                                
82
As evidenced by Supreme Court case law, the scale that was once 
tipped in Tinker to favor student speech has gradually reverted towards 
school authorities.83 Further, there is controversy on whether these 
four cases should be read as a collective whole or as each case 
governing its own distinct area of speech.84 The struggle to reconcile 
these four Supreme Court cases is apparent when reading lower court 
opinions across various jurisdictions.85 This problem is especially 
prevalent when lower courts deal with speech that is anti-homosexual 
because courts are reluctant to liken anti-homosexual speech to the 
 
79 Id. at 2636.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 2638. 
82 Id. at 2637. 
83 Mollen, supra note 36, at 1510 (noting that, when read “together, Fraser, 
Hazelwood, and Morse confirm that students in fact do leave some of their First 
Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
84See id. at 1510-11. When the Court ruled in Morse, it did not resolve the 
confusion on interpreting Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood. Id. at 1510. Instead the 
Court “added additional uncertainty to the scope of students’ free speech rights.” Id. 
85 See, e.g., Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 
668 (7th Cir. 2008); Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 
965 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 
2006), reh’g en banc denied, 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. 
Ct. 1484 (2007). 
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political speech in Tinker.86 Section II explores how two lower court 
opinions approached Supreme Court precedent when faced with anti-
homosexual speech. Then, Section III analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach to anti-homosexual speech in Nuxoll.  
 
II. TINKERING AROUND: HOW TWO COURTS APPROACHED STUDENT 
SPEECH THAT WAS ANTI-HOMOSEXUAL  
 
Before reviewing the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Nuxoll, this 
Note considers two possible approaches that the Seventh Circuit could 
have adopted.87 The two courts each dealt with similar anti-
homosexual t-shirts.88 Each court interpreted Supreme Court 
precedent differently, which illustrates the uncertainty that courts fa
in this murky area of First Amendment jurisprude 89
ce 
nce.  
                                                
 
A. Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board of Education  
 
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio relied on 
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard when it addressed a t-shirt 
that opposed homosexuality, Islam, and abortion in Nixon v. Northern 
Local School District Board of Education.90 The 2005 case dealt with 
a black t-shirt with white lettering that read “INTOLERANT” and 
“Jesus said. . .I am the way, the truth and the life. John 14:6” on the 
front and “Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder! 
Some issues are just black and white!” on the back.91 
In its opinion, the Nixon court found that Tinker, Fraser, and 
Hazelwood were a trilogy that carved out three categories of student 
 
86 Amanda L. Houle, Note, From T-Shirts to Teaching: May Public Schools 
Constitutionally Regulate Antihomosexual Speech?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2477, 
2478 (2008). 
87 See Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 973; Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178. 
88 Id. 
89 Houle, supra, note 86, at 2497. 
90 383 F. Supp. 2d at 974.  
91 Id. at 967. 
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speech.92 Hazelwood governed school-sponsored speech, Fraser 
governed vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech, and 
Tinker governed speech that fell in neither category.93 The t-shirt was 
a potentially offensive political viewpoint and not vulgar or lewd 
under Fraser’s speech exception.94 The message on the t-shirt als
outside of Hazelwood because it was not school-sponsored.
o fell 
                                                
95  
Thus, Tinker was the only standard that governed Nixon’s t-
shirt.96 The court held that there was no evidence of any history of 
violence or disorder that would prohibit the t-shirt under the 
“substantial disruption” standard.97 The Nixon court took a narrow 
reading of the “rights of others” standard from Tinker and found that 
the invasion of the rights of others referred to the right to be secure 
and let alone.98 A silent, passive t-shirt did not collide with the rights 
of other students to be left alone.99  
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 Id. at 969. 
93 Id. (citing Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 
2001) and S.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 421-22 (3rd Cir. 2003)). 
94 See id. at 969-971. The court noted that Fraser was applicable to Boroff v. 
Van Wert City Board of Education, 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000), which found that a 
school could prohibit a Marilyn Manson t-shirt because Marilyn Manson sings about 
suicide, murder, and drugs and to Smith v. Mount Pleasant Public Schools, 285 F. 
Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. Mich. 2003), which held that a student’s comments referring to 
sexual activity of school administrators could be prohibited under Fraser. Id. at 970-
71. Fraser was not applicable to potentially offensive political viewpoints, such as a 
George Bush “International Terrorist” t-shirt in Barber v. Dearborn Public Schools, 
286 F. Supp. 2d 847 (E.D. Mich. 2003) or a Confederate flag t-shirt in Bragg v. 
Swanson, 371 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D.W. Va. 2005). Id. at 971. 
95 Id. at 969. 
96 Id. at 971. 
97 Id. at 973.  
98 Id. at 974.  
99 Id. 
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B. Harper v. Poway Unified School District 
 
Most courts completely overlook the “rights of others” standard 
from Tinker.100 However, the Ninth Circuit in Harper v. Poway 
Unified School District relied on a broad reading of the standard in a 
case with nearly identical facts to Nuxoll.101 In 2006, Tyler Chase 
Harper donned a t-shirt to protest the “Day of Silence” which read 
“BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS 
CONDEMNED” on the front and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS 
SHAMEFUL, ‘Romans 1:27’” on the back.102  
In reaching its holding, a divided Ninth Circuit first construed 
Supreme Court precedent as governing “three distinct areas of student 
speech.”103 Fraser governed vulgar and lewd speech; Hazelwood 
governed school-sponsored speech; and Tinker governed all other 
speech.104 The court decided Harper’s claim fit under Tinker;105 
however, the Ninth Circuit did not analyze the case under the 
“substantial disruption” standard.106 Instead the court made its 
decision under the rarely used “rights of others” standard.107  
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis concluded that Harper’s t-shirt 
infringed upon other students in the most fundamental way by denying 
                                                 
100 Andrew Etter, Casenote, Student Speech, the Rights of Others, and a Dual-
Reasonableness Standard: Zamecnik ex rel. Zamecnik v. Prairie District No. 204 
Board of Education, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. Ill.), 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1343, 1348 
(2008). 
101 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 455 F.3d 1052 
(9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). 
102 Id. at 1171. 
103 Id. at 1176-1177 (quoting Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 
524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 1177 nn.14-15.  
106 Id. at 1177.  
107 See id. at 1178; see also id. at 1178 n.18 (rejecting the notion that the right 
to be left alone from Tinker is limited to assault, defamation, invasion of privacy, 
extortion, blackmail, or any other tort).  
 229
15
Powers: Unraveling <em>Tinker</em>: The Seventh Circuit Leaves Student Sp
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
the right to “‘be secure and to be left alone.’”108 In reaching its 
holding, the Ninth Circuit found that students have a right to be free 
from “physical assaults,” and the court even took judicial notice that 
“psychological attacks” can cause a blow to a youth’s self-esteem.109 
The court then used several studies to support granting judicial notice 
that gay students are harmed by derogatory messages, like Harper’s t-
shirt, because they are harmful to the students’ health, welfare, 
educational performance, and ultimate potential for success in life.110 
Finally, the Harper majority limited its application of the “rights of 
others” standard to “derogatory and injurious remarks directed at 
students’ minority status such as race, religion, and sexual 
orientation.”111 
Even though the court recognized that Tinker, Fraser, and 
Hazelwood governed different areas of student speech, the Ninth 
Circuit blended the holdings of the three cases when it determined that 
the school’s prohibition of the t-shirt was not viewpoint 
discrimination.112 The Ninth Circuit used language from those three 
cases when it asserted that a school may “permit, and even encourage, 
discussions of tolerance, equality and democracy without being 
required to provide equal time for student or other speech espousing 
intolerance, bigotry or hatred.”113  
                                                 
108 Id. at 1178 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 1179. 
111 Id. at 1183.  
112 Id. at 1185.  
113 Id. The court found that a school may prohibit some speech under Tinker 
even if the consequence is viewpoint discrimination. Id. To support its proposition, 
the court referred to language from Hazelwood that asserted that “[a] school need not 
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission . . . 
even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school” and 
to language from Fraser which stated that part of a school’s “basic educational 
mission” is the inculcation of “fundamental values of habits and manners of civility 
essential to a democratic society.” Id. 
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After ruling that the “rights of others” standard was violated, the 
Ninth Circuit explicitly reserved judgment on whether Harper’s t-shirt 
would cause a “substantial disruption.”114 Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether the “rights of others” standard has any muster in future 
student speech cases.115 The dissent opined that much of the majority’s 
approach was “entirely a judicial creation.”116 The issue remains up-
in-the-air because the Ninth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc.117 The 
case was granted a writ of certiorari; however, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the case as moot because Harper graduated from high 
school.118 
Nonetheless, the district court in Nuxoll still used the factually 
similar opinion for its persuasive authority and adopted the “rights of 
others” standard as well.119 Then the Seventh Circuit took an even 
different approach than Nixon and Harper in Nuxoll.120 The Seventh 
Circuit’s approach in Nuxoll is discussed in Section III of this Note.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 Id. at 1184. The district court found that the testimony from school 
employees who claimed the t-shirt caused tense conversations and altercations 
between students was not enough evidence that the t-shirt would cause a substantial 
disruption. Id. at 1184, 1185. 
115 See, e.g., Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 
F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008). 
116 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1201 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  
117 See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). 
118 See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); see also 
Etter, supra note 100, at 1352 (arguing that the decision to vacate the case meant that 
the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s “rights of others” 
interpretation). 
119 See Zamecnik ex. rel. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204 Bd. of 
Educ., 2007 WL 1141597, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
120 See Nuxoll, 523 F.3d. at 674. 
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III. A NOVEL APPROACH IN NUXOLL EX REL. NUXOLL V. INDIAN PRAIRIE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 204 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
The “Day of Silence” was created by the Gay, Lesbian, and 
Straight Education Network as an annual event to draw attention to the 
harassment of homosexuals.121 Some students observe the day by 
remaining silent in class, and some teachers will not call on them as 
part of observance of the day.122 Other students and faculty members 
support the cause by wearing t-shirts with slogans that neither support 
homosexuality nor criticize heterosexuality, such as “Be Who You 
Are.”123 In response to the “Day of Silence,” the Alliance Defense 
Fund (“ADF”) created an event the day after called the “Day of 
Truth.”124 The ADF promotes their event by wearing t-shirts that read 
“day of truth” on the front and “The Truth cannot be silenced” on the 
back.125  
Starting in 2003, a student organization named the Gay/Straight 
Alliance sponsored the “Day of Silence” each year at Necqua Valley 
High School in Naperville, Illinois.126 On the 2006 “Day of Truth,” 
Heidi Zamecnik, a student opposed to homosexuality, remained silent 
and wore a t-shirt that read “My Day of Silence, Straight Alliance” on 
                                                 
121 Zamecnik, 2007 WL 1141597, at *1. Although the Seventh Circuit 
referenced homosexuals alone, the “Day of Silence” website also states that the day 
is intended to raise awareness to the harassment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender individuals. Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network, Day of 
Silence, http://www.dayofsilence.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
122 Zamecnik, 2007 WL 1141597, at *1.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.; see also Alliance Defense Fund, Day of Truth, 
http://www.dayoftruth.org/main/default.aspx (last visited November 11, 2008).  
125 Zamecnik, 2007 WL 1141597, at *1. 
126 Id.  
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the front and “Be Happy, Not Gay” on the back.127 School officials 
required Zamecnik to cross off the “Not Gay.”128 
In March 2007, Zamecnik and freshman student Alexander Nuxoll 
filed a lawsuit through their parents to obtain a preliminary injunction 
against their school district to remain silent on the “Day of Truth” and 
to wear shirts, buttons, or stickers containing the message “Be Happy, 
Not Gay.”129 The only issue in front of the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois was the constitutionality of the censorship 
of the slogan “Be Happy, Not Gay” because the school district 
stipulated that it would allow the Plaintiffs to remain silent in protest 
to the “Day of Silence.”130 The parties agreed to withhold discovery 
and to stipulate the facts in order to expedite the decision before the 
2007 “Day of Silence.”131  
The school district supported its ban of the “Be Happy, Not Gay” 
slogan on its policy prohibiting derogatory comments against other 
students.132 Specifically, the school’s policy forbade oral or written 
“derogatory comments” made on school grounds “that refer[red] to 
race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability.”133 
The school deemed “Be Happy, Not Gay” as a derogatory comment 
that referred to a particular sexual orientation.134 The school would 
prohibit a shirt that had “Not Gay” or any negative phrase about 
homosexuality.135 However, the school would allow a t-shirt that 
                                                 
127 Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 
670 (7th Cir. 2008). 
128 Zamecnik, 2007 WL 1141597, at *2.  
129 Id. at *6. The Alliance Defense Fund represented Plaintiffs in the lawsuit; 
however, Plaintiffs did not wish to be a part of the ADF’s “Day of Truth” activities. 
Id. at *5 Instead they wished to have their own counterprotest activities on the day 
after the “Day of Silence.” Id. 
130 Id. at *2, *6. 
131 Id. at *2. 
132 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 670. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Zamecnik, 2007 WL 1141597, at *6. 
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displayed a positive statement, such as “Be Happy, Be Straight” or 
“Straight Alliance.”136  
 
B. The District Court Opinion in Zamecnik ex rel. Zamecnik v. Indian 
Prairie School District No. 204 Board of Education 
 
Similarly to Harper, the district court relied on the Tinker “rights 
of others” standard when it denied Zamecnik and Nuxoll’s request for 
a preliminary injunction.137 Through Seventh Circuit precedent and 
Harper, the district court found that the Seventh Circuit would likely 
rule that the high school’s interest in protecting its students would 
permit the restriction of the t-shirt.138  
The Seventh Circuit had not yet ruled on a question of restricting 
speech that was derogatory to a category of students.139 However, the 
district court predicted that the Seventh Circuit would include 
pedagogical concerns as well as the school’s educational mission in 
formulating a holding, which was consistent with Harper’s use of the 
“rights of others” standard.140 The district court recognized that 
Harper did not limit considerations of a school’s “pedagogical 
interests” or “basic educational mission” to situations involving vulgar 
or lewd speech like Fraser or school-sponsored speech like 
Hazelwood.141 Rather, Harper used the holdings in Fraser and 
Hazelwood to support the notion that a school does not have to tolerate 
any speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission.142 
Under this rationale, Harper noted that a public school may engage in 
some viewpoint discrimination, such as permitting discussions of 
                                                 
136 Id. at *2. 
137 Id. at *11. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at *10. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at *8-9 (quoting Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 
1185-86 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
142 Id. 
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tolerance and equality without allowing time for speech espousing 
intolerance or hatred.143  
To support its outcome, the district court noted that the Seventh 
Circuit had taken a school’s pedagogical interests into consideration 
even if the speech was not school-sponsored.144 Thus, the district court 
believed that the Seventh Circuit would find that promoting tolerance 
among students and protecting gay students from harassment was a 
legitimate pedagogical concern that would allow the school to restrict 
speech expressing negative statements about homosexuality.145 The 
court stated that “Be Happy, Not Gay” was less disparaging than the t-
shirts at issue in Harper or Nixon.146 Nonetheless, the district court 
concluded that the t-shirt was a derogatory statement that could do 
significant harm to gay youth.147 
In 2007, neither of the Plaintiffs wore a t-shirt that contained “Be 
Happy, Not Gay” or tried to protest the “Day of Silence” for fear of 
being punished.148 Heidi Zamecnik graduated high school, thus she 
lacked the standing to further pursue the case.149 Still Alexander 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 See id. at *10. The district court was referring to three Seventh Circuit cases 
where the student speech was not school-sponsored, yet the majority applied 
Hazelwood’s language that “a school need not tolerate speech that is contrary to 
its . . . educational mission.” Id. The three cases were Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse 
School, 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving an elementary school that prohibited 
students from distributing religious literature); Brandt v. Board of Education of 
Chicago, 480 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2007) (concerning a school’s refusal to allow eighth 
graders to wear t-shirts worn in protest to the official class shirt); and Gernetzke v. 
Kenosha Unified School District No. 1, 274 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2001) (regarding a 
high school’s decision to forbid a cross to be painted on a school mural). Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at *11. 
148 Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 
670 (7th Cir. 2008). 
149 Id. 
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Nuxoll and the ADF continued to pursue the appeal in time for the 
2008 “Day of Silence.”150  
 
C. The Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
 On appeal, the school urged the Seventh Circuit to uphold the 
district court’s decision and its reliance on Harper.151 The school 
argued that Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse should be read as 
an “interrelated framework for addressing the appropriateness of 
school actions” rather than “four narrow, unrelated exceptions to the 
notion of unbridled student speech.”152 In addition, the school cited 
other Seventh Circuit opinions as consistent with the district court’s 
acknowledgement that the Seventh Circuit takes a school’s 
pedagogical interests and its educational mission into consideration 
absent a Hazelwood school-sponsored set of facts.153 The school’s 
argument was bolstered by the amici curiae briefs of the Illinois 
Association of School Boards, Inc. and the Illinois Association of 
School Administrators.154 
On the other side, Nuxoll argued for an approach like Nixon by 
reading the Supreme Court cases as a four-part framework.155 Nuxoll 
asserted that the slogan “Be Happy, Not Gay” must be governed by 
                                                 
150 See Transcript of Opinion at 1, Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. 
Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1050) (The opinion was 
released in transcript form because Nuxoll sought “a preliminary injunction to enable 
him to engage in an activity scheduled for April 28.”). 
151 Brief of the Defendants-Appellees at 26, Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian 
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1050). 
152 Id. at 15-16.  
153 See id. at 29 (referring to Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 
(7th Cir. 1996); Brandt v. Bd. of Ed. of Chi., 480 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
154 See Brief of Amici Curiae of Illinois Association of School Boards, Inc., et 
al., for Affirmance of Decision Below at 3, Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie 
Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1050) (The brief argued 
that Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse are not an “‘either/or.’”).  
155 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 15, Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie 
Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1050). 
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Tinker only as it is “non-vulgar, private student speech unrelated to 
drugs.”156 Nuxoll asserted that the school had not provided evidence 
that the t-shirt would bring a “substantial disruption.”157 Nuxoll 
rejected the district court’s interpretation of the “rights of others” 
standard from Tinker alleging that the standard referred to a 
“substantive and verifiable right,” not a right to be free from critical or 
negative speech.158 The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois 
filed a brief of amicus curiae supporting neither party, but advocated 
that Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse should be read as exceptions to 
Tinker.159 
The Seventh Circuit, led by Judge Posner, reversed the case in 
favor of Nuxoll.160 The result of Nuxoll seemed to be a victory for 
both parties.161 Nuxoll was allowed to display his “Be Happy, Not 
Gay” t-shirt in counterprotest to the “Day of Silence.”162 At the same 
time, the Seventh Circuit adopted a definition of “substantial 
disruption” that will have a farther reach for school administrators to 
restrict student speech.163 Judge Rovner concurred in the judgment,
but would not have needed to expand upon the “substantial disruption”
definition to reach her co 164
 
 
nclusion.  
                                                 
156 See id. at 16-17; see also id. at 9 (“Political speech by students must be 
allowed in high schools unless it is drug related, vulgar, materially disruptive, or 
tortuously infringes with the rights of others . . . Expressing the statement ‘Be 
Happy, Not Gay’ does not violate any of these standards.”). 
157 Id. at 26. 
158 Id. at 28-29.  
159 Brief of Amicus Curiae for American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois in 
Support of Neither Party at 7-8, Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 
204, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1050). The ACLU relied in part on Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Morse in making this determination. Id. 
160 Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 
676 (7th Cir. 2008).  
161 Eugene Volokh, High School Student Speech and “Be Happy, Not Gay” T-
Shirt, The Volokh Conspiracy, April 24, 2008, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1209077493.shtml (last visited November 6, 2008).  
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 676-77 (Rovner, J., concurring).  
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To start its opinion, the majority acknowledged that Nuxoll could 
not make any negative comments about other students that constituted 
“fighting words” because they are outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.165 Nuxoll conceded at oral argument that he could not 
wear a shirt that read, “homosexuals go to Hell,” because they are 
fighting words.166  
The majority used Nuxoll’s concession about “fighting words” as 
a jumping-off point to weigh the interests of student speech versus the 
harm that can be caused by too much free speech in the school 
environment.167 The majority found that the contribution that students 
can make to the public debate was “modest,” whereas the school’s 
countervailing interest in protecting students from offensive speech 
was “undeniable.”168 The majority recognized that a “heavy federal 
constitutional hand on the regulation of student speech by school 
authorities would make little sense.”169 Moreover, the court said that 
high school students cannot be raised in an “‘intellectual bubble’” 
absent discussion of important public issues.170 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit noted the dangers in 
allowing too much free speech, especially of the “wounding” kind.171 
The majority supported its conclusion with studies that teens who are 
subject to teasing and harassment find it difficult to concentrate and to 
exceed in school.172 The court asserted that the problems that troubled 
schools are having, including high drop-out rates, will not be 
                                                 
165 Id. at 670 (majority opinion) (citing Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572-
73 (1942)). 
166 Id. at 671; but see id. at 678 n.3 (Rovner, J., concurring) (Judge Rovner 
asserted that this was not the position taken by Nuxoll and that Nuxoll conceded that 
his speech was governed by Tinker and not Chaplinsky.).  
167 Id. at 671 (majority opinion).  
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 
(7th Cir. 2001)). 
171 Id. 
172 Id.  
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alleviated by “First Amendment free-for-alls.”173 Further, the majority 
opined that school administrators are in the better position to regulate 
student speech, as “judges are incompetent to tell school authorities 
how to run schools in a way that will preserve an atmosphere 
conducive to learning.”174 
The majority then found that the school’s policy prohibiting 
derogatory comments took into account those two interests.175 The 
school’s policy did not halt open discussion by the students, rather it 
forbade only those disparaging against “unalterable or otherwise 
deeply rooted personal characteristics” about which most people, 
including students, were highly sensitive.176 In the majority’s opinion, 
these types of derogatory comments can “strike a person at the core of 
his being.”177 After weighing the competing interests, the majority 
went on to analyze the merits of the preliminary injunction under 
Supreme Court precedent.178  
 
1. A Möbius Strip: The Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation of Tinker179 
 
Unlike Harper and the district court in Zamecnik, the Seventh 
Circuit refused to adopt the “rights of others” standard from Tinker.180 
The Seventh Circuit limited the “rights of others” standard to the 
invasion of a legal right by another student and found that there is no 
legal right to prevent criticism of a student’s beliefs or lifestyle.181 
After determining that the “rights of others” standard was 
inapplicable, the Seventh Circuit turned its attention to Nuxoll’s 
                                                 
173 Id. at 672. 
174 Id. at 671. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 See id. at 677 n.1 (Rovner, J., concurring).  
180 Id. at 672 (majority opinion).  
181 Id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992); and Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
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argument that Justice Alito’s concurrence was controlling in Morse.182 
Although Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy were necessary votes in 
the five Justice majority, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
concurrence was not controlling because the Justices joined the 
majority in Morse.183 In doing so, the court rejected Justice Alito’s 
limitation that Morse had no bearing on political speech.184 
Then the Seventh Circuit considered the permissible scope of the 
“substantial disruption” standard.185 The majority found that Tinker 
was distinguishable from the facts in Nuxoll because the school in 
Tinker had engaged in viewpoint discrimination by forbidding only 
black armbands protesting Vietnam and not expression that was pro-
Vietnam.186 The school district’s policy in Nuxoll was viewpoint 
neutral because it prohibited all derogatory comments, not just 
comments about heterosexuality or homosexuality.187 Because of the 
difference in the two cases, the majority determined that it should not 
use Tinker alone to determine the scope of the “substantial disruption” 
standard.188 Instead, the court relied on Fraser and Morse as well in 
making its holding.189 The majority first deduced from Morse and 
Fraser that a “substantial disruption” did not have to be a concern that 
serious consequences will ensue.190 Rather the school only needs to 
                                                 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 673. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. The court noted the school districts were given a “pretty free hand” in 
prohibiting speech at elementary schools or with speech not protected by the First 
Amendment. Id. In those scenarios, a school could prohibit student speech absent a 
showing of a “substantial disruption” or interference with the school environment. 
Id. Where those situations were missing, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
“substantial disruption” standard still was not absolute. Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 674.  
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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allege facts that would reasonably lead school officials to forecast a 
“substantial disruption.”191  
Applying Tinker, Fraser, and Morse, the Seventh Circuit next 
adopted a more expansive definition of “substantial disruption.”192 
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit found that the concerns in Fraser and 
Morse were not a fear of violence.193 Fraser had looked to the state’s 
interests in protecting students from lewd and vulgar speech and the 
effect that the speech could have on young students.194 The court also 
found it relevant that Morse considered the psychological effects that 
drugs have on students.195 Using these cases, the Seventh Circuit 
inferred that a “substantial disruption” was not only a fear of violence, 
but it included any speech that would lead to “a decline in students’ 
test scores, an upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of a sick 
school.”196  
The Seventh Circuit then ruled that the school’s policy against 
derogatory language “appear[ed] to satisfy the test.”197 The policy 
appeared to maintain a school environment conducive to learning and 
covered the spectrum of “highly sensitive identity characteristics.”198 
The majority also found that the derogatory comment policy did not 
constitute viewpoint discrimination as Nuxoll could advocate 
heterosexuality on religious grounds.199 The court conceded that this 
policy would not wash if applied to adults, if extended to students 
outside of school, or if “derogatory comments” were overextended to 
the sensitive.200 However, the Seventh Circuit asserted that in the 
unique school environment, “school authorities have a protective 
                                                 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. (emphasis added). 
196 Id. (emphasis added). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
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relationship and responsibility to all the students.”201 Thus, Nuxoll 
was not entitled to a preliminary injunction against the policy 202.  
                                                
Despite ruling in favor of the school district’s policy, the Seventh 
Circuit took the middle ground when it ruled that “Be Happy, Not 
Gay” was only “tepidly negative” and not in violation of the school’s 
policy.203 The majority stated that “Be Happy, Drink Pepsi” would not 
be disparaging to Coke.204 Once the majority realized that its Pepsi-
Coke analysis “missed the mark” on the facts in Nuxoll, it found that 
the phrase “Be Happy, Not Gay” was not demeaning or derogatory to 
other students.205 The phrase would not “poison the educational 
atmosphere” or cause incident in the classrooms.206  
The close of the opinion foreshadowed that Nuxoll would 
continue to challenge the Seventh Circuit’s narrow ruling.207 The 
majority called for the district court to strike a balance between a 
student’s right to campaign against sexual orientation and the school’s 
interest in maintaining a school environment where students are not 
distracted by debates over sexual identity.208 
 
2. Judge Rovner Weighs in on her Brothers209 
 
Although Judge Rovner concurred in the judgment, she expressed 
her dismay at the majority’s analysis under Tinker.210 She compared 
the majority’s portrayal of Tinker to a Möbius strip, a geometrical 
 
201 Id. at 674-75.  
202 Id. at 675.  
203 Id. at 676.  
204 Id. at 675. 
205 Id. at 675-76. 
206 Id. at 676.  
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Judge Rovner referred to Judge Posner and Judge Kanne as her brothers 
three times in her concurrence. See id. at 677, 678, 679 (Rovner, J., concurring). 
210 Id. at 676. 
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shape that twists 180° to form a continuous one-sided surface.211 
Judge Rovner opined that Tinker was not a viewpoint case becaus
Supreme Court never mentioned whether the school allowed speech or 
expressions favorable to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.
e the 
he rule 
’s 
years prior.  
                                                
212 
Rather Tinker was a case about subject matter discrimination, and 
Judge Rovner would not limit Tinker to a situation where a school 
banned all discussion of a particular subject.213 
Judge Rovner also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent.214 First, she opposed the majority’s use of 
Hazelwood reasoning in a case that did not involve school-sponsored 
speech.215 Although the majority never mentioned the Hazelwood 
case, she opined that the majority “expend[ed] much ink trying to 
strike a balance between the interests of free speech and ordered 
learning, a discussion which sound[ed] remarkably similar to t
of Hazelwood.”216 Second, Judge Rovner diverged from the majority
expansion of the “substantial disruption” definition.217 Judge Rovner 
opined that this case was a simple “substantial disruption” case, and 
Nuxoll should have prevailed under the standard delineated in 
Tinker.218 She would not have applied Fraser or Morse in ruling for 
Nuxoll.219 She would have ruled that the school district did not 
provide sufficient evidence that reasonably would have led school 
authorities to forecast a substantial disruption, and there was not 
evidence of substantial disruption when Heidi Zamecnik wore the t-
shirt two 220
 
211 Id. at 676 n.1. 
212 Id. at 677. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 676, 677.  
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 677.  
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In addition, Judge Rovner did not like the majority’s 
characterization of Nuxoll’s t-shirt as only “tepidly negative.”221 Judge 
Rovner found that the t-shirt was “clearly intended to derogate 
homosexuals.”222 Nonetheless, the t-shirt slogan was not the kind of 
speech that materially and substantially interfered with school 
activities.223 Finally, Judge Rovner advocated the value of speech 
among high school students and called for the judiciary to protect open 
debate in schools.224  
 
IV. EVALUATION OF NUXOLL: WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
WAS NOT SO “HAPPY” 
 
Although the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision 
for Alexander Nuxoll, the case seemed to be a success for the school 
district.225 Through its majority opinion, the Seventh Circuit adopted a 
very broad definition of “substantial disruption” that will allow school 
officials to restrict a wide range of student speech in future cases.226 
The effects of this decision will likely quiet the voices of student 
speakers in the Seventh Circuit.227 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
221 Id. at 678. 
222 Id. at 679. Judge Rovner cited to Nuxoll’s brief, where he criticized 
homosexual behavior. Id. She also found that teenagers today commonly use the 
expression “gay” as a negative term, such as “that sweater is so gay.” Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 680. 
225 Volokh, supra note 161.  
226 Id.   
227 See Logan v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 2008 WL 4411518, at *5 (N.D. Ind. 
2008) (Referring to Nuxoll, the court stated that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has shown its 
reluctance to interfere with school officials’ rules in running a local school.”).  
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A. The Seventh Circuit Should Have Followed Justice Alito’s 
Concurrence in Morse v. Frederick  
 
In its ruling in Nuxoll, the Seventh Circuit ignored Justice Alito’s 
concurrence and instead only focused on the majority in Morse.228 The 
Seventh Circuit found that Justice Alito’s concurrence was not 
controlling; rather Justice Alito “wanted to emphasize that in allowing 
a school to forbid student speech that encourages the use of illegal 
drugs the Court was not giving schools carte blanche to regulate 
student speech.”229 In ignoring Justice Alito’s concurrence, the 
Seventh Circuit extended the majority’s reasoning for restricting 
illegal drug use to prohibiting political speech protected under 
Tinker.230 
In his concurrence in Morse, Justice Alito, joined by Justice 
Kennedy, wrote to make the limitations of Morse clear.231 Justice Alito 
made two distinct points about the majority’s decision: 
 
(a) [I]t goes no further than to hold that a public school may 
restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for 
any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on any political or social issues such as the 
wisdom of the war on drugs or legalizing marijuana for 
medicinal use.232 
 
 Justice Alito further explained that the majority opinion rejected 
any argument that public schools could censor speech on the basis that 
it interferes with its educational mission.233 The concurrence also 
                                                 
228 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 673. 
229 Id.  
230 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).  
231 Id. 
232 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  
233 Id. at 2637. 
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made it explicitly clear that the decision in Morse was at “the far 
reaches of what the First Amendment permits.”234  
In ignoring Justice Alito’s concurrence, the Seventh Circuit failed 
to appreciate its significance to the majority opinion in Morse.235 
When determining the value of a concurrence that joins the majority 
opinion, lower courts should consider whether the Justice’s vote was 
numerically necessary.236 The willingness of the majority to 
accommodate is often directly proportional to the number of votes 
supporting the majority’s result.237 When a vote is numerically 
necessary, such as the fifth vote, the willingness to accommodate is at 
its peak.238 On the other hand, the majority’s willingness to 
accommodate is unnecessary when a majority vote has already been 
procured.239  
In Morse, there is a strong argument that Justice Alito’s 
concurrence should be read in conjunction with the majority 
opinion.240 Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy were the crucial fourth 
and fifth votes to the five Justice majority.241 And contrary to the case 
cited by the majority in Nuxoll,242 Justice Alito did not write his 
                                                 
234 Id. at 2638 (emphasis added). 
235 See Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(The Fifth Circuit found that Justice Alito’s opinion was “controlling.”).  
236 Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of 
Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2105 (1995) 
(assuming that Justice Alito’s concurrence is considered a simple concurrence.).  
237 Id. at 2106. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 See Eugene Volokh, What Did Morse v. Frederick Do to the Free Speech 
Rights of Students Enrolled in K-12 Schools, The Volokh Conspiracy, June 26, 2007, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1182830987.shtml (last visited November 30, 2008) 
(proposing that “Justice Alito’s opinion, as the narrowest grounds offered by any of 
the Justices whose votes were necessary for the majority, thus seems to offer the 
controlling legal rule.”). 
241 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). 
242 See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003). The 
Seventh Circuit, led by Judge Posner, expressed doubt that Justice Powell’s 
 246
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 9
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss1/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
concurrence to extend the majority opinion past its scope.243 He wrote 
separately to make it clear that he joined the majority on the 
understanding that Morse was at the “far reaches of what the First 
Amendment permits.”244 
In rejecting Justice Alito’s concurrence, the Seventh Circuit has 
given Morse a broader range.245 Not only did the Seventh Circuit 
apply Morse to political speech, the Seventh Circuit also ignored 
Justice Alito’s restriction that the reason for foregoing a Tinker 
analysis in Morse was because there was a threat to the physical safety 
of children.246 Instead the Seventh Circuit locked in on language from 
the majority opinion referencing the psychological harms caused by 
illegal drugs.247 Using this line from Morse, the Seventh Circuit 
asserted, “Imagine the psychological effects if the plaintiff wore a T-
shirt on which was written ‘blacks have lower IQs than whites’ or ‘a 
woman’s place is in the home.’”248 In finding that psychological 
effects of speech can play into a Tinker analysis, the Seventh Circuit 
abandoned the rationale from Tinker that suppressing speech in the 
school environment requires more than a “mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
                                                                                                                   
concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), was controlling even 
though he was the crucial vote to the majority opinion. Id. 
243 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring). 
244 Id.; see also Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 
2007). Justice Alito’s “concurring opinion appear[ed] to have two primary purposes: 
providing specificity to the rule announced by the majority opinion, and, relatedly, 
ensuring that political speech will remain protected within the school setting.” Id.  
245 Volokh, supra note 161.  
246 Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 
674 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Miller v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 588 
F. Supp. 2d 606, 625 (E.D. Pa. 2008) The court relied on Justice Alito’s concurrence 
in Morse to hold that school administrators did not have to demonstrate a substantial 
disruption where student’s t-shirt conveyed a message of “force, violence, and 
violation of the law in the form of illegal vigilante behavior.” Id. 
247 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674 (emphasis added). 
248 Id. 
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viewpoint.”249 And if other courts follow this approach of looking at 
psychological effects of student speech unrelated to drugs, it could 
give Morse a very long reach.250 For example, this type of reasoning 
would arguably give the courts in Nuxoll and Harper ample 
justification for restricting any political speech that could be perceived 
as potentially hateful.251 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Should Not Have Inferred from Fraser and 
Morse When Defining “Substantial Disruption”  
 
Instead of adhering to the Tinker definition of the “substantial 
disruption” standard, the Seventh Circuit used Fraser and Morse to 
redefine a “substantial disruption.”252 Tinker defined a “substantial 
disruption” as a finding that student speech would “materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of school.”253 The 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the “substantial disruption” 
standard arguably extends farther than Tinker would have ever 
allowed.254 
In Nuxoll, the Seventh Circuit inferred from Fraser and Morse 
that a “substantial disruption” could be included in a particular type of 
speech that would lead to “a decline in students’ test scores, an 
upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school.”255 
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit relied on how both cases took into 
                                                 
249 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969). 
250 Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts: 
Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2008). 
251 Id.  
252 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674. 
253 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  
254 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674; see also Volokh, supra note 161 (noting that 
“[T]he majority would tolerate a wide range of broad, vague, and viewpoint-based 
restrictions on student speech.”).  
255 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674. 
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account something more than a disorder or disturbance.256 Fraser 
examined how a vulgar, sexually charged speech could seriously 
damage an audience on the verge of sexuality.257 Morse was fearful of 
the physical, psychological, and addictive effects that illegal drugs 
have on youth.258 The Seventh Circuit used these concerns to conclude 
that a school could prohibit student speech absent an actual disorder or 
disturbance.259  
One problem with the Seventh Circuit’s expansion of the 
“substantial disruption” standard is that neither Fraser nor Morse 
relied on the “substantial disruption” standard in reaching their 
holdings.260 The Supreme Court noted in Morse that the mode of 
analysis in Fraser was unclear, but it certainly did not conduct the 
“substantial disruption” analysis prescribed by Tinker.261 The Court 
bypassed the “substantial disruption” standard in Fraser because of 
the school district’s compelling interest in protecting minors from 
lewd and offensive language.262 The Supreme Court found that a 
school district should be able to restrict vulgar language because it 
could be confusing and potentially damaging to youth on the verge of 
sexuality.263 Significantly, the Court also noted the “marked 
distinction” between the political speech in Tinker and the sexual 
content in the student’s speech.264 
The Supreme Court in Morse did not apply the “substantial 
disruption” standard because it found that preventing illegal drug use 
                                                 
256 Id. 
257 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
258 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007).  
259 Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674. 
260 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 and Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629; see also 
Dickler, supra note 34, at 373 (asserting that the “substantial disruption” test was 
eschewed in Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse). 
261 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627. Although the Supreme Court has set Fraser out 
as an exception to Tinker, it “has not clarified the debate on what that exception is.” 
DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 n.1 (D. N.J. 2007). 
262 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. 
263 Id. at 683. 
264 Id. at 680.  
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among youth was a compelling interest that should forego a Tinker 
analysis.265 Morse recognized that deterring drug use was an important 
interest because of the dangers of the physical, psychological, and 
addictive effects of drugs are most severe during youth.266 The 
Supreme Court classified the danger of illicit drug use as far more 
serious and palpable than Tinker’s concern that schools may not 
restrict speech because of “‘a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.’”267 
Morse represented the school’s right to ban speech that advocated the 
use of illegal drugs, which was an independent exception from the 
Tinker “substantial disruption” standard.268 
Another problem with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Nuxoll is 
that it appears that a majority of the Justices in the Supreme Court 
would not apply Morse to the definition of “substantial disruption.”269 
As discussed, Justices Alito and Kennedy joined the majority on the 
understanding that Morse had no bearing on political speech protected 
by Tinker.270 Those Justices would permit the regulation of lewd or 
vulgar speech under Fraser, school-sponsored speech under 
Hazelwood, and speech that advocated illegal drug use under 
Morse.271 Any other speech would be regulated under Tinker.272  
                                                 
265 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.  
266 Id. at 2628 (quoting Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-62 
(1995)). 
267 Id. at 2629 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).  
268 Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).  
269 See id. at 2637, 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring), 2646 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
270 Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). 
271 Id. at 2637. Justice Alito also wrote the majority opinion in Saxe v. State 
College Area School District, 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001), where he asserted 
that Fraser allowed a school to regulate lewd and vulgar speech, Hazelwood allowed 
the prohibition of school-sponsored speech, and Tinker governed all other speech.  
272 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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In Justice Thomas’s concurrence, he also found that Morse created 
a new exception to Tinker, along with Fraser and Hazelwood.273 It 
also appeared as though Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg 
considered Morse to be another exception to Tinker in their dissent.274 
The dissent recognized that the majority “carv[ed] out” pro-drug 
speech from the protection of the First Amendment.275 Thus, if these 
five Justices were to align (at a minimum), they would make a 
majority of the Court reading Morse as an exception to Tinker and 
most likely disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s application of 
Morse.276 
The Seventh Circuit should have remained true to Tinker’s 
definition of “substantial disruption” when dealing with “Be Happy, 
Not Gay,” a passive, political message.277 If the Seventh Circuit had 
done so, it would have reached its holding easily, as Judge Rovner did 
in her concurrence.278 The Seventh Circuit should have found that the 
school district had no evidence that would forecast a material or 
substantial interference with the work or discipline of school and that 
there was no disruption two years earlier.279 The Seventh Circuit 
should have reversed the case in favor of Alexander Nuxoll without 
confusing “substantial disruption” by including Fraser and Morse in 
its definition.280 
 
 
                                                 
273 See id.at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Today, the Court creates another 
exception.”). 
274 Id. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
275 Id.  
276 Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring), 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring), 2646 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  
277 Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant at 15, Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie 
Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1050) (asserting that 
Nuxoll’s expression falls under Tinker, not under Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse). 
278 Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 
676-77 (7th Cir. 2008) (Rovner, J., concurring) 
279 Id. at 677.  
280 Id. 
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 252
CONCLUSION 
 
At the end of the Nuxoll decision, Judge Posner predicted that this 
lawsuit would continue.281 Alexander Nuxoll will want to wear more 
controversial t-shirts in attempt to push the boundaries of his First 
Amendment rights.282 And Nuxoll will not be alone in his attempts to 
see how far he can stretch his free speech rights at school. It is likely 
that there will be more students testing the outer limits of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. With more student speech cases, comes 
more confusion among lower courts. This confusion is clearly 
illustrated when comparing the vastly different approaches taken to 
similar student speech challenges in Nuxoll, Zamecnik, Harper, and 
Nixon.  
Perhaps these four opinions illustrate that Judge Posner was right 
when he said that judges are incompetent to tell school administrators 
how to run schools in a way that is conducive to learning.283 Maybe 
the problems that American school districts are facing will not be 
solved by “First Amendment free-for-alls.”284 Or maybe Judge Rovner 
was correct when she asserted the need for the judiciary to intervene in 
student speech cases in order to prevent schools from stifling young 
minds.285 Perhaps courts should protect open debate on controversial 
topics, and the school should only step in when the speech becomes 
substantially disruptive.286  
Either way, the Supreme Court should see Judge Posner’s 
foreshadow at the end of Nuxoll as a call for the Court to clarify this 
murky area of the law. That way, courts will know how to proceed in 
future student speech cases, and there will be no more opinions that 
can be compared to a Möbius strip. 
                                                 
281 Id. at 676 (majority opinion). 
282 Id. 
283 Id. at 671. 
284 Id. at 672.  
285 Id. at 679-680 (Rovner, J., concurring) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (U.S. 1943)).  
286 Id. at 680.  
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